

Transcript of teachings by Khen Rinpoche Geshe Chonyi

Lesson No: 15

Date: 7th August 2012

Question: To understand the forward pervasion, it is said that the sign and similar class must be equal in extent or the sign must be lesser in extent than the similar class (Page 5, Handout No. 7 dated 24 July 2012). Therefore in the syllogism, *the subject, sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product*, product and impermanent phenomenon are equal in extent.

If I look at phenomena that are mutually inclusive with product, can I state the syllogism in this way: *the subject, sound, is a functioning thing because of being an impermanent phenomenon?* Can I swap them around because they are mutually inclusive and are equal in extent?

Answer: Yes you can.

With regard to the sign that is stated in the above syllogism, the extent of the pervasion between the sign and its similar class may be the same. Having said that, it is not necessarily so. With regard to the sign that is posited:

- if the extent of its pervasion is (1) equal to or (2) lesser than the predicate to be proven, that is all right.
- if the extent of its pervasion is greater than the predicate to be proven, then that is incorrect. When the extent of the pervasion of the sign is greater than the predicate to be proven, you cannot establish the forward pervasion.

For example, the syllogism is this: *the subject, the sound of the conch, is impermanent because it arises through human effort.*

If it is a result of human effort, it is necessarily impermanent, but whatever is impermanent is not necessarily a result of human effort.

In the syllogism that we have been using, *the subject, sound, is impermanent because of being a product*, the sign is an instance of product.

Question: Is human effort referring to the thought consciousness?

Answer: You need effort to blow the conch shell to make the sound.

Non-Valid Awarenesses (Handout No. 8 dated 7th August 2012)


Among the seven-fold divisions of consciousnesses, these five – the

subsequent cogniser, correctly assuming consciousness, awareness to which an object appears and is not ascertained, doubting consciousness, and wrong consciousness - are non-valid consciousnesses.

Subsequent cogniser


The definition of a **subsequent cognizer** is: **a knower that realises what has already been realised** (Page 1).

The main thing to understand about this definition is not just that it is a mind that knows something that has already been realised. Rather the import of this definition is that whatever the subsequent cogniser realises, it realises it through the force of the realisation of a valid cogniser in the first place. That is the meaning. This is how you should understand this definition. A subsequent cogniser is a knower that realises what has already been realised by a valid cogniser. Whatever a subsequent cogniser knows, that knowledge is induced by the prior realisation of the object by a valid cogniser



There are three divisions of subsequent cognisers:

1. directly perceiving subsequent cogniser
2. conceptual subsequent cogniser
3. subsequent cogniser that is neither of those two



A directly perceiving subsequent cogniser has five divisions:

- directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is a sense direct perceiver
e.g. second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue
- directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is a mental direct perceiver
e.g. the second moment of a clairvoyance knowing another's mind
- directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is a self-knowing direct perceiver
e.g. the second moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing an eye consciousness
- directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is a yogic direct perceiver
e.g. the second moment of an uninterrupted path of a path of seeing
- directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is none of those four
e.g. the second moment of a direct perceiver (Page 1)

Question: Why is there a division of a “directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is none of those four”?

Answer: If you were asked, “If it is a directly perceiving subsequent cogniser, is it necessarily one of those four?” what will your answer be?

Khen Rinpoche: Whether your answer is “Yes” or “No,” you must have confidence in your answer.

You have to be confident and know why you are taking that position. There is something that is other than these four. The illustration given is the second moment of a direct perceiver.

So if you were asked, “Is a second moment of a direct perceiver a directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is a mental direct perceiver?” what is your answer?

Khen Rinpoche: Your mind must be active when I am asking you. Otherwise there is no point in debating this because you won't get anything out of it. You must have confidence in what you are saying.

Question from Khen Rinpoche: Is a person a human being?

(Students answer: “No.”)

Khen Rinpoche: Why “No”? If someone were to ask you, “Is a person a donkey?” remembering that person refers not to a human being but to all living beings, what will be your answer? It will be, “No,” right? If you were to say a person is a donkey, what is the problem with that?

Student: We will all be donkeys?

Khen Rinpoche: No, you cannot say that. That is not the logic. If a person is a donkey, it does not mean that you become a donkey. It is not like that. The logic doesn't work that way.

When you say, "A person is donkey," then you would have to say, "A person is a horse. A person is an elephant." That means that there is something that is a common locus between an elephant and the donkey. It is not about you becoming donkey. You must get the idea.

What is the problem when you say, "A person is a donkey." When you say "Yes," immediately someone will ask, "Is a person a horse?" What are you to say then? You cannot say, "No," because you have already said, "Yes" earlier. Then someone asks "Is a person an elephant?" What can you say? A person would then become everything.

Question from Khen Rinpoche: Is the second moment of a direct perceiver a mental direct perceiver?

Khen Rinpoche: No.

If it is not a mental direct perceiver, it is also not a yogic direct perceiver. It is also not a self-knowing direct perceiver. It is also not a sense direct perceiver. But it is a direct perceiver.

The thing here is to use your brains because when someone debates with you, you have to be able to say something. You can't say, for example, that it is a mental direct perceiver because you will run into problems.

When you think about direct perceivers, the second moment of a direct perceiver has to be one of these four: a directly perceiving subsequent cogniser that is a sense direct perceiver, a mental direct perceiver, a self-knowing direct perceiver, or a yogic direct perceiver. But during debate when someone states, "The subject, the second moment of a direct perceiver ..." what are you going to say?

Khen Rinpoche: You can bring the same logic there. How are you going to answer in debate?

Earlier on we looked at direct perceivers that are divided into four divisions: sense direct perceivers, mental direct perceivers, self-knowing direct perceivers, and yogic direct perceiver. Only four divisions are posited. Those are the four divisions of direct perceivers. If someone were to ask you, "Is there a direct perceiver that is none of these four?" what would you say?

Khen Rinpoche: Do you understand my question? If you don't get it, then I would have to explain everything regarding direct perceivers again. You all know these four divisions.

Now the question is: “If it is a direct perceiver, is it necessarily one of these four divisions?”

Student: This category is just a generic term describing the class of direct perceivers. A direct perceiver necessarily has to be one of the four divisions, but at the same time, this generic class is none of the four divisions because it cannot be any one of them.

Khen Rinpoche: Yes.

If a directly perceiving subsequent cogniser is not necessarily one of the four direct perceivers, then what about the category of direct perceivers itself? If it is a direct perceiver, is it necessarily one of these four divisions? That is a question to which you have to answer, “Yes” or “No.” When there is no answer, then there is no discussion and no debate. It is only through debate that it becomes clearer, but you have to give an answer.

A conceptual subsequent cogniser has two divisions:

- conceptual subsequent cogniser that is induced by a direct perceiver
e.g. a factually concordant ascertaining consciousness ascertaining blue that is induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue (Page 1).

First you have a sense direct perceiver ascertaining blue and, subsequently, you have a remembering consciousness thinking of blue.

- conceptual subsequent cogniser that are induced by inferential cognisers
e.g. the second moment of an inferential cogniser realizing sound to be impermanent (Page 1).

By depending on the sign, product, one generates an inferential cogniser realising sound to be impermanent. The first moment is a valid cogniser. The second moment would be a conceptual subsequent cogniser that, in this illustration, is induced by an inferential cogniser.

Is there a subsequent cogniser that is neither a direct perceiver nor a conceptual consciousness? There is the third division: a subsequent cogniser that is neither of those two. Can you posit an illustration for a subsequent cogniser that is neither a direct perceiver nor a conceptual consciousness? An illustration would be a subsequent cogniser.

If it is a conceptual subsequent cogniser, is it necessarily one of these two:

1. something that is induced by a direct perceiver or
2. something that is induced by an inferential cogniser?

If you think about it, the answer would probably be “No,” e.g., the subsequent cogniser that is induced by a conceptual subsequent cogniser. In debate, you can say, “A conceptual subsequent cogniser itself”.

What we have brought up here is a subsequent cogniser that is induced by a subsequent cogniser and that is none of the two, i.e., induced by a direct perceiver or inferential cogniser.

Question: I refer to the sequence of the sense direct perceiver apprehending an object followed by a mental direct perceiver that lasts for the shortest moment of time, and then the conceptual consciousness realising the object. Can that conceptual consciousness realising the object be understood to be this conceptual subsequent cogniser that is induced by a direct perceiver?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What do we mean by the term, “induced,” in the definition of the conceptual subsequent cogniser that is induced by a direct perceiver?

Answer: Why do we generate a remembering consciousness remembering blue? Because of having realised blue sometime in the past. Blue was realised by a valid cogniser, so the valid cogniser realising blue is the condition that induces one to remember blue.

In order to remember something, does that something need to be realised by a valid cogniser earlier? In the first place, without realising something by a valid cogniser, is it possible to remember it later on? Is it possible to remember something that you did not realise?

Student: Remembering the experience of the eye consciousness apprehending two moons which is a wrong consciousness.

Khen Rinpoche: *Would you remember two moons or not in your life?*

Student: No, because there is no such thing as two moons.

Khen Rinpoche: *So you won't remember two moons in your life. It is not possible to remember two moons.*

Student: But I will remember the *experience* of the appearance of two moons although there is no such thing as two moons in the sky.

Khen Rinpoche: *So you won't remember two moons, right?*

Student: Yes. I cannot say that I will remember two moons, but I can remember the experience of seeing two moons.

Khen Rinpoche: *So you accept that you cannot remember the two moons?*

Student: Yes, I probably would have to accept that.

Khen Rinpoche: *So what do you remember?*

Student: I can remember the appearance of seeing two moons. That would become a remembrance of an appearance of a non-existent. So this is an example of remembering something that is not realised by a direct perceiver, because there is no such thing as two moons.

Khen Rinpoche: All right.

I think it is difficult to be able to remember something if you have not realised it earlier with valid cognition. The Sutra School asserts self-knowers. Why do they assert self-knowers? It is to account for memory, especially being able to remember the experience of having seen something.

Why do we remember that earlier there was an eye consciousness apprehending blue? Because at that time there was a self-knower experiencing that eye consciousness apprehending blue. If you have not realised blue and you don't know what blue is, it is not possible to remember blue. This is the assertion of most of the tenets up to the Autonomy Middle Way School (AMWS). Without a prior realisation of blue by a valid cogniser, there is no way that you can remember blue later on.

Why do we remember the experience of having seeing blue? Why do we remember that earlier there was an eye consciousness apprehending blue? Because at that time, when the eye consciousness was apprehending blue, there was a self-knower experiencing that eye consciousness. That self-knower is a valid cogniser. Therefore, subsequently, it is possible for us to remember the experience of having seen blue, i.e., remember that the eye consciousness apprehended blue.

But it is possible to remember the appearance of two moons if you had had the experience of seeing two moons for whatever reason. Later on you can remember that.

Similarly we do remember our dreams. For example, when you dream of an elephant, later on you will remember you dreamt of an elephant. You will remember the appearance of the elephant in your dream. A dream consciousness is not a valid cogniser. However it is possible to remember what we dreamt.

It follows then in order for a remembering consciousness to arise, it need not be preceded by a valid cogniser. That being the case, there is no need for a self-knower.

Khen Rinpoche: I think you may be more confused now!

Although there are many tenets asserting self-knowers, they are not the ultimate tenets. It is not reality. They have a reason for positing self-knowers, but when you analyse their logic, you will find faults with it.

When we talk about reality, what exactly is it and what is it not. In general, how can one remember something that one has not realised? That does not happen. You cannot remember something that you did not see or realised. Is it possible for someone who has never seen blue in his life to remember blue? From this you can see that it is very difficult to say that you can remember something without having realised it in the first place.

According to the Consequence Middle Way School (CMWS), if it is a dualistic mind, it is necessarily valid with respect to what appears to it. We are not saying that it is a valid cogniser, but it is valid with respect to what appears to it.

For this reason, say, in a dream where there is an appearance of a dream elephant, although the dream consciousness is a wrong consciousness, because it is valid with respect to the appearance of a dream elephant, in that sense, it realises the dream elephant. Therefore, subsequently, it is possible to remember the appearance of a dream elephant. This is the position of the CMWS, the highest tenet.

Do the AMWS, the Mind-only School, and the Sutra School assert the same thing? That is something to be analysed.

Correctly assuming consciousness

A correctly assuming consciousness is either generated upon a reason or no reason at all and it has five divisions:

1. Correctly assuming consciousness that does not have a reason

For example: someone says, “Sound is impermanent” without stating any reason. You hear this and think, “Yes, sound is impermanent,” without any reason whatsoever. This is a correctly assuming consciousness that does not have a reason.

2. Correctly assuming consciousness that has a contradictory reason

For example: you think that sound is impermanent because it is not able to perform a function. This is a contradictory reason but you do think, “Sound is impermanent.” The reason is contradictory because whatever is empty of being able to perform a function is necessarily permanent, not impermanent.

3. Correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason is indefinite [or lacks pervasion]

For example: you conclude that sound is impermanent because sound is an object of comprehension. This is an indefinite reason because whatever is an object of comprehension is not necessarily impermanent.

4. Correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason is not established.

For example: you generate a thought thinking that sound is impermanent by depending on the sign of it being an object of apprehension by an eye consciousness. The reason is not established because you cannot establish the sign on the subject.

5. *Correctly assuming consciousness for which a reason exists but is not settled*

Although product is the correct sign for establishing that sound is an impermanent phenomenon, in order for product to be a correct sign for someone, he must have established the three modes. The sign must exist on the subject. The sign is necessarily the predicate to be proven. When all these conditions come together, only then he is ready to generate an inferential valid cogniser. Although product is a correct sign in the proof that sound is an impermanent phenomenon, if you state the correct sign to someone who has *not* yet ascertained that (1) sound is a product and (2) that product is necessarily impermanent, then for him it has not become a correct sign.

The reason proving that sound is impermanent exists but, until that person has realised the three modes in his mind, he has yet to generate an inferential cogniser. Although in general it is a correct sign, for that person to whom you are trying to prove that sound is impermanent, it has not become a correct sign yet. Therefore although it is a reason, it is a reason that has not been settled.

Question: In the Sutra School, can an ordinary being directly realise impermanence?

Answer: In the Sutra School, probably not, because to them the mind that directly realises impermanence would be a yogic direct perceiver that exists only in the continua of Superiors.

Question: The person to whom the syllogism is directed: *the subject, sound, is an impermanent phenomenon because of being a product*, must realise that product is an impermanent phenomenon. Product is an impermanent phenomenon because of something else. That would be an inferential valid cognition for an ordinary being, not a direct valid cognition, right?

To the person to whom you are trying to prove that sound is impermanent, that person must necessarily have the inferential cognition realising that product is necessarily impermanent. Can an ordinary person directly realise that product is impermanent?

Answer: In the context of talking about realising impermanence here, it is referring to subtle impermanence. An ordinary being cannot realise subtle impermanence directly. Only a Superior can do that.

Also a mental direct perceiver apprehending form in the continuum of an ordinary being is an AAA because it exists only for the shortest moment of time. If you say that a mental direct perceiver apprehending form realises its object, that would incur the fallacy that an ordinary being can realise subtle impermanence. That would incur the fallacy that that ordinary being becomes a Superior. According to the Sutra School, only Superiors can directly realise subtle impermanence.

Question: So in that syllogism even the sign is also ascertained by inferential valid cognition?

Answer: It is the same. An ordinary being cannot *directly* realise that product is impermanent.

Question: A functioning thing, manifest phenomenon, and so forth is explicitly realised by a direct valid cogniser. In other words, a permanent phenomenon is *not* explicitly realised by a direct perceiver. How then does a yogic direct perceiver realise emptiness which is a permanent phenomenon?

Answer: The yogic direct perceiver realises the selflessness of persons by explicitly realising the compositional factors that are devoid of a self of persons. In dependence on that, it then implicitly realises the selflessness of persons.

We mentioned before that whatever is a functioning thing is necessarily the appearing object of a direct perceiver. Based on this, is the selflessness of persons the appearing object of a direct perceiver?

The selflessness of persons is a permanent phenomenon. Does the selflessness of persons then appear to a yogic direct perceiver? Because it does not appear to a yogic direct perceiver apprehending the selflessness of persons, therefore the selflessness of persons is not directly realised by a yogic direct perceiver.

But if you were asked, “Does a yogic direct perceiver realise the selflessness of persons?” you probably have to say, “Yes.”

A yogic direct perceiver realises the selflessness of persons.

The yogic direct perceiver realises the selflessness of persons directly.

The selflessness of persons is not directly realised by a yogic direct perceiver.

The appearing object of a direct perceiver is necessarily a functioning thing. That being the case, is the selflessness of persons the appearing object of a direct perceiver? We have to say, “No.”

If someone were then to say, “The selflessness of persons is the appearing object of a direct perceiver because the selflessness of persons is realised

directly by a yogic direct perceiver” ...

Khen Rinpoche: What are you going to say?

The selflessness of persons is not the appearing object of a direct perceiver. But you accepted that the selflessness of persons is the appearing object of a direct perceiver because the selflessness of a person is realised directly by a yogic direct perceiver.

The selflessness of persons is not the appearing object of a direct perceiver because there is no direct perceiver that directly realises the selflessness of persons.

Question: What is the object of engagement of this yogic direct perceiver that realises the selflessness of persons?

Answer: The selflessness of persons.

With regard to the remaining consciousnesses – the AAA, doubt, and wrong consciousness – you can read up on them on your own. I am not going through them. You can ask if you have any questions. Otherwise I am not going through them.

We will start on the mental factors. The 51 mental factors are easier to deal with because they are straightforward.

Khen Rinpoche: We will be introducing what are the 51 mental factors, what is anger, what is attachment, and so forth. What we have covered so far is more complicated. The next one or two months should be easier. I hope so.

This subject has been challenging. Nevertheless you have all tried. You are listening. You are thinking about it. You are studying. That is very good. From my side, it is quite difficult to teach this but, because of your effort of continuing to listen and to learn, that gives me some encouragement.

Those of you who had studied this topic in the previous Basic Program, you are now studying this for the second time. I guess most of you are finding it relatively easier. The reason why it is easier for these students is because they have heard it before. For those of you who are hearing this for the second time, when I say this, I don't have to say anything else. It is very obvious because it is your own experience.

Perhaps for those of you who are hearing this for the first time, you may not understand what I am trying to say. It is a fact. It is the nature of things that when you do something again and again, it becomes easier.

Khen Rinpoche: So, the new ones, make sure this becomes your subsequent

cognition next time!

Question: Can I say that the appearing object of a wrong consciousness is not necessarily an existent?

Answer: Perhaps it may be all right to say something like that.

You remember when we were looking at the facsimile of a direct perceiver. The non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver that are sense consciousnesses, those minds have a clear appearance of a non-existent.

Non-conceptual wrong consciousness, non-conceptual facsimile of a direct perceiver and consciousness that has a clear appearance of a non-existence are mutually inclusive. So a non-conceptual wrong consciousness can have a clear appearance of a non-existent.

Question: The eye consciousness seeing one moon as two moons: is the appearing object of that eye consciousness (1) two moons or (2) the clear appearance of two moons?

Answer: If you accept that a wrong consciousness can have a clear appearance of a non-existent, you don't have to say "appearance" of two moons because two moons are non-existent.

Is it all right then to posit two moons as the appearing object?

Student: Yes.

Khen Rinpoche: Could be. Whether you say two moons or appearance of two moons, it should be all right.

You have to analyse whether you should posit one moon or not? To the consciousness where one moon appears as two moons, does one moon appear? Is one moon its appearing object?

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